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Abstract. One of the most prominent effects of social milita-
rization is hostility toward anyone of the same nationality as 
the enemy. This is common in conventional wars, but has 
become even more pronounced in the War on Terror, as the 
enemy is hidden in the civilian population. Western fear of 
Muslims was common before this war, but has escalated 
since. Muslims are portrayed as a monolithic group that is 
intrinsically hostile to the west. The war narrative legitimizes 
xenophobia by associating individual actions with all mem-
bers of a group, and for that reason, it is potentially danger-
ous to Canadian multiculturalism. 
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Résumé. Un des effets les plus saillants de la militarisation 
sociale est l’hostilité face à quiconque dont la nationalité est 
identique à celle de l’ennemie. Cela est courant dans les 
guerres conventionnelles, mais cela a été plus marqué dans 
la Guerre contre le Terrorisme, du fait que l’ennemi se cache 
dans la population civile. La peur occidentale des Musul-
mans était courante avant la guerre, mais elle s’est accrue 
depuis lors. Les Musulumans sont dépeints comme un 
groupe monolithique qui est intrinsèquement hostile contre 
l’Ouest. Le discours lié à la guerre légitimise la xénophobie 
en associant des actions individuelles à tous les membres 
d’un groupe, et pour cet motif, il est potentiellement dan-
gereux pour le multiculturalisme canadien. 
 
Mots clefs. Multiculturalisme; tolérance; Islam; guerre 
contre le terrorisme. 
 
 
A persistent challenge in war is training soldiers to kill their 
enemy. This is why one of the oldest byproducts of militari-
zation is the demonization of the enemy. The enemy must be 
transformed into something fundamentally different and 
intrinsically threatening, thereby making him acceptable to 
kill. In Agamben’s terms, the enemy must be made into a 
homo sacer in order to absolve the soldiers from the normal 
prohibition on killing (Agamben 1998). Although there is a 
long history of the normalization of killing spreading into the 
civil sphere to ensure popular support for a war, this has 
intensified since the rise of liberal democracies. This form of 
government places the ultimate authority over war in the 
hands of representatives who are answerable to the citizens, 
and therefore means that war must have a popular basis if it 
is to have enduring support. The people must share the 
soldiers’ disdain for the enemy in order to support killing.  
Democratic governments have often built support for 
war by using the same tactics as those employed to prepare 
soldiers for battle.  A persistent stream of information de-
monizes the new enemy, framing it in terms of existing 
prejudices and transforming it into a monolithic group with-
out individual variation. This has been particularly necessary 
since the Vietnam War, as the power of mass opposition to 
illegitimate violence was made clear. To generate support for 
the War on Terror, politicians, reporters, scholars, and ordi-
nary citizens have gone to great lengths to emphasize the 
otherness of those associated with terrorism. Whether inten-
tional or not, the security concern has become an excuse for 
xenophobia and racism. The conflict has provided a conven-
ient way of reframing existing prejudices. Giving these feel-
ings a referent, especially one that is connected to a legiti-
mate military target is dangerous and allows even the most 
virulent anti-Muslim sentiment to be framed in terms of an 
ongoing war.  
Geyer defines militarization as “the contradictory and 
tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for 
the production of violence” (Geyer 1989: 79). In this case, 
the militarization is focused externally and internally. Exter-
nally, Muslims are portrayed as a violent and unified group 
that is intrinsically hostile to the west. With so many Mus-
lims now living in the west, this narrative gives the appear-
ance of a hostile body living within our society – an exten-
sion of the enemy force within our own borders. The terror-
ists’ tactics reinforce this, as they depend on blending into 
the civilian population. The result is a culture of hostility in 
which the ongoing War on Terror is reproduced domestically 
as a struggle to monitor the enemy within.    
The danger of legitimized and militarized xenophobia is 
particularly threatening for Canada. Although building 
popular support for war may be more difficult in Canada 
than elsewhere, there is also more at stake in terms of atti-
tudes toward race and culture. Canada is among the coun-
tries with the strongest record of support for minority rights 
and the acceptance of difference. The country has long dis-
tinguished itself from the American melting pot, which cele-
brates the loss of culture and acceptance of a uniform na-
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tionality, by promoting diversity within the confines of a 
unified state. The cultural mosaic is central to the Canadian 
identity and helps to differentiate it from the US. The reality 
of the mosaic is contested, but even if overstated, it is a 
powerful normative claim that the country should respect 
minority rights. As this essay will show, the imperative to 
normalize violence has transformed the civil spheres of the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe, bring-
ing hidden tensions to the surface and creating new ones. 
Specifically, it has merged with and justified the fear of 
immigration. Now, with Canada’s growing military partner-
ship with the US and the conservative political victories in 
2006 and 2008, it appears that Canadian multiculturalism 
could be one of the casualties in the War on Terror.  
 
The War on Terror 
 
Fear of terrorism and disdain for terrorists are justified. It is 
understandable for those who have lost friends and family 
members in attacks to want the perpetrators to be punished. 
The desire for national security is likewise reasonable. If war 
is ever justified, then it is in cases of self-defense against acts 
of terror or in which only retaliation can prevent further 
attacks. Drawing attention to the strategies of the War on 
Terror and its consequences for the civil sphere should not 
detract from this. More importantly, it should not serve as a 
justification for tacitly accepting terrorism. Nevertheless, the 
motives of revenge and self-preservation are often extended 
beyond reason and serve as justifications for any extreme 
actions deemed necessary to defeat the enemy.  
The interplay between justified anger and extreme re-
sponses makes the War on Terror particularly interesting 
from a theoretical perspective. If the war were entirely un-
justified, then it would be easy to respond with simple con-
demnation. The conflict is clearly more complex than this. 
Because it is rooted in the desires for security and correcting 
an injustice, it is difficult to draw a precise line between 
morally acceptable and unacceptable responses. However, 
one can judge the social consequences of the war without 
resolving these complex questions. Specifically, one can see 
how the moral ambiguity of the conflict helps to cover what 
might otherwise be considered extreme measures. Whatever 
the moral status of the War on Terror, the conflict has clearly 
transformed civil-military relations and reshaped the civil 
sphere to reflect the tension of a society that is always pre-
pared for an attack.  
During times of war civilians, like the soldiers them-
selves, must become accustomed to the idea of killing other 
people. Desensitization often figures heavily in the training 
of soldiers because they must face others directly and do the 
killing themselves (Grossman 2009). Civilians play a less 
direct role, which only requires that they accept the war and 
the military policies. In practice, this means that civilians do 
not need the same intensive training as soldiers, but that 
both must see the enemy as someone who is not protected by 
ordinary moral rules. Wars promote a hatred of the Other, 
but who the Other is depends on the kind of war being 
waged. In conventional wars, the Other is clearly marked, 
but in the War on Terror, locating the enemy combatants 
and even defining them is far more difficult.  
The War on Terror is by nature a conflict that transcends 
the line between military and civilian life. In conventional 
wars, it should be easy to distinguish combatants from non-
combatants. Soldiers must wear uniforms, are usually found 
in large groups, and are stationed in strategic locations. 
Civilians are unarmed, out of uniform, and often concentrat-
ed in demilitarized areas. This is the usual state of affairs in 
conventional wars. Even when this distinction is ambiguous, 
it rarely breaks down completely. For example, during the 
Second World War, resistance fighters across Europe 
blurred the line between civilian and soldier by taking up 
arms against occupying forces. Although many of the re-
sistance fighters hid among civilians, this tended to be out of 
necessity rather than desire. Mixing with the civilian popula-
tion was a sign of weakness. Irregular forces usually formed 
distinct organizations existing outside civilian life as their 
size and capacity increased. Thus, we see the most powerful 
partisan organizations growing into large, permanent forces 
and behaving somewhat like regular soldiers (Ellis 1995; 
Asprey 2002). The same process of growth and leaving the 
civil sphere has been the normal path for paramilitary 
groups in other wars as well (Joes 1992). 
Terrorists, by contrast, deliberately integrate into the ci-
vilian population and resist organizing themselves into any-
thing resembling a military force. They challenge the idea of 
what it is to be a combatant, as the debates surrounding 
their proper status for imprisonment and interrogation 
purposes make clear. Terrorists’ strategies make them ex-
tremely difficult to locate. Even high-capacity organizations 
avoid presenting a visible target. Moreover, irregular soldiers 
of past wars generally fought on their home territory. Parti-
sans defended an invaded land or resisted colonial govern-
ments. They did not voluntarily cross into  foreign territories 
in search of weak targets. The fact that terrorists often do 
this further distinguishes them from other irregular combat-
ants and shifts security concerns onto the civilian popula-
tion. In short, they represent a unique enemy whose form 
encourages mass suspicion.   
Many countries already have a record of discrimination 
against citizens of the same nationality or religion as the 
enemy during times of war. During the Second World War, 
the United States and Canada were safe from the same civil 
unrest as occupied Europe. Yet, these countries behaved as 
though they were threatened by their own people. Over 
110,000 Japanese Americans, many of them citizens, living 
in the Western US were interned. President Roosevelt au-
thorized the imprisonment out of fear that these people 
could be agents of the Japanese government (Robinson 
2001). The Canadian government took the same course 
during the Second World War and did so for the same rea-
sons. Around 21,000 Canadians of Japanese descent had 
their property confiscated and were locked in camps for 
much of the war (Conklin 1996). Although it tends to receive 
less attention than Japanese internment, this also happened 
to many Canadians during the First World War. Immigrants 
from the countries making up the Central Powers, primarily 
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Germans and Austrians, were interned (Gwyn 1995:187). 
The hostility toward Japanese and German soldiers became 
hostility toward anyone of those nationalities. 
If the civil sphere can become part of the battlefield dur-
ing a conventional war, by countries safe from domestic 
conflict, then it should come as no surprise that the same 
militarization of the civil sphere has been reproduced in the 
War on Terror – a conflict defined by hidden enemies and 
domestic threats. The result is that liberal, democratic coun-
tries with a relatively high level of respect for minority rights 
have begun persecuting Muslims, Arabs, and those who look 
like Arabs. Thus far, there has been nothing comparable to 
the Japanese internment. However, there have been strong 
informal sanctions against Muslims and official actions 
against individuals based on their resemblance to a terrorist 
profile.  
 
Cultural Division 
 
The discourse of demonizing the enemy helps to make war 
possible; but even when the war is almost universally con-
sidered moral, as the Second World War is, it produces 
social repercussions. Hostility transforms cultural values 
and reshapes the way of life. There is ample evidence of an 
increasing fascination with popular culture representations 
of terrorism and news reports on the subject. Even with real 
attacks rarely happening, the constant discussion of terror-
ism on the news, in movies, and on television, ensures that 
terrorism does not slip from the public’s attention even as 
recessions, natural disasters, and civil rights violations raise 
new concerns.  
Television and movies are dominated by themes of inse-
curity and conflict. Reporters discuss potential attacks that 
could inflict thousands of casualties. Politicians convince 
their constituents to accept lasting alterations to their civil 
liberties. No matter what specific form it takes, information 
and misinformation about certain Muslims becomes a cari-
cature of an entire group. The search for an answer to the 
question of why terrorists would attack civilians has led to 
the creation of an entire industry dedicated to exploring 
their motives. Even when this literature makes progress, it 
often inadvertently contributes to the rampant Islamopho-
bia. The myths that terrorists are insane or brainwashed 
have been thoroughly discredited (Sageman 2008; Pape 
2003)– a significant advance in the understanding of terror-
ism – but this evidence shifts the focus from the individuals 
who perpetrated the attacks to entire cultures. If causation 
cannot be located in the individual, then culture and religion 
are often blamed. Commentators discuss an inherent hostili-
ty of Arabs or Islam, and, in doing so associate entire groups 
with the actions of a few representatives.  
The idea of a clash of civilizations is a prime example of 
how individual action becomes transformed into a group 
identity. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” was first 
published in 1993 as an essay (Huntington 1992). In it, he 
argues that the world will become increasingly dominated by 
large culturally and religiously defined blocks, most of which 
are antagonistic. Among other things, he predicts a major 
conflict between Islam and the West. His book by the same 
name made this point more forcefully and helped to estab-
lish an entire literature analyzing cultural antipathies 
(Huntington 1996). Huntington characterizes each of the 
major civilizations as largely uniform entities that pursue a 
single agenda. The clash of civilizations argument is a prime 
example of the tendency of imbuing cultures with a false 
degree of coherence and uniformity. Benhabib rightly criti-
cizes this understanding of culture and blames it for the 
often simplistic responses to cultural disputes (Benhabib 
2002). Other scholars have made the same point directly 
against Huntington (Sen 2007; Berman 2004). Despite this 
backlash, Huntington’s perception seems to be one of the 
dominant ways of understanding the War on Terror. 
It is possible that there is something in culture or religion 
that causes violence, but it seems implausible that it can be 
so clearly connected to a single identity. However, in this 
case the truth hardly matters. The thought that the violence 
is produced by identity traits shared by millions of people in 
one’s own country is enough by itself to transform the hatred 
of the enemy into a hatred of anyone sharing some of the 
enemy’s characteristics. Thus, the military conflict becomes 
a civil conflict – a war of monitoring Muslims, subjecting 
them to additional security measures, harassing them, and 
reproducing the idea of the monolithic enemy. In this way, 
the War on Terror has been used in the US, UK, and the 
countries of Western Europe as a way of fighting multicul-
turalism.  
 
The Immigrant Threat 
 
The United States is often called a country of immigrants, 
but this commonality does little to alleviate the tension 
between newly arriving groups and those who already con-
sider themselves assimilated. Like all immigrant groups, 
Arabs have faced discrimination and been derided as a group 
that cannot become truly American. Discrimination against 
Arabs is at least partly explainable with reference to the 
ongoing discrimination against immigrants. Immigrants 
threaten the sense of national integrity and are easily mis-
understood. They are particularly worrisome for Americans 
because they undermine the feeling of isolation from the rest 
of the world. Immigrants are a clear sign of the borders’ 
permeability – a sign that distant conflicts can reemerge at 
home. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that many of 
those falsely accused of terrorism are recent immigrants 
(Murray 2004). Unlike citizens by birth, immigrants are 
presumed guilty because of their identity. 
There were cases of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim violence 
before 9/11 and these certainly would have continued even if 
there had not been an attack. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
this group of immigrants would be as central to contempo-
rary political debates if it had not been for the combined 
effects of the narrative of cultural difference that started in 
the 1990s, the image of Muslims as terrorists, and, above all, 
the ongoing wars against Muslim opponents. As Huntington 
and his supporters show, the idea that Muslims represent a 
distinct group that is intrinsically hostile to the West was 
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prevalent for at least a decade before the attack. The terrorist 
attacks of the late 1990s and the September 11, 2001 attacks 
seemed to confirm this suspicion. In doing so, they renew 
interest in the idea of irreconcilable cultural difference.  
It is important to see how much that the anti-
immigration sentiment and general xenophobia have been 
magnified, and that this is strongly related to the ongoing 
war. In the US, the fear of immigrants and tendency to es-
sentialize their identities were preconditions for the post-
9/11 militarization of the civil sphere. Xenophobia is, of 
course, a major problem in itself, but the ongoing military 
actions have given it a much different character. Muslims are 
not hated or feared for their cultural and religious differ-
ences alone. They are no longer simply the Other. They are 
frequently represented as threats to American culture or 
American religious values. This is especially true of con-
servative commentators who cultivate the image of being 
‘tough on terrorism’ and ‘tough on immigration’ to appeal to 
their constituents.  
US immigration law has changed since the attacks to re-
flect the fear of Arabs and Muslims (Akram 2004). The idea 
that these are fundamentally different sorts of people with 
values that are incompatible with western society is a justifi-
cation of this – an unassailable justification when immigra-
tion restrictions are linked to the values of patriotism and 
safety. Muslims are seen as potential enemy combatants, 
and no amount of evidence can counteract the perceived 
threat they pose because terrorism by nature reinforces the 
perception of threat from the civil sphere. This narrative was 
reinforced at the highest levels of government. President 
Bush and his staff continually invoked negative Arab stereo-
types in speeches and in new policy decisions (Merskin 
2004). 
Race relations in the UK have followed a similar pattern. 
Discrimination against Arabs was prevalent even before 
September 11, but has increased since (Cainkar 2002; 
Poynting 2007). Before the War on Terror, xenophobia was 
primarily a response to the migration of Arabs and Africans 
to England. The association between Muslims and violence 
was already firmly established by the ongoing conflicts in the 
Middle East, but there was little confrontation with terrorists 
domestically. This shows little sign of abating. Even after the 
British military scaled down its military commitment in Iraq, 
the social effects remain. Muslims continue to be a suspected 
minority.   
Across Europe and in the US, the fear of a different cul-
ture infiltrating and corrupting societies has increased 
sharply over the past decade. Refiguring this fear in security 
terms, in the language of an ongoing war against a group of 
people that are associated with Muslims, legitimizes the 
desire to scrutinize them and doubt their loyalty. Civilians 
are encouraged to be as constantly vigilant as soldiers on the 
front lines. The terror threat level system, increased pres-
ence of security forces, and constant news coverage of terror-
ism all contribute to an atmosphere of insecurity. They en-
courage citizens to be constantly on guard against an attack. 
Campaigns like New York City’s “If you see something, say 
something” encourage civilians to constantly monitor each 
other. Through the militarization of the civil sphere, Mus-
lims have been transformed from outsiders to enemy opera-
tives threatening the west internally. “[T]he War on Terror 
has contributed to the emergence of new justifications for 
racism within the United States and Europe. In public dis-
courses, fears of terrorist attacks have become displaced 
onto migrants and citizens of color, particularly male South 
Asians and Middle Easterners” (Al-Ali 2009: 7).  
The idea of the sleeper cell is particularly problematic. 
More than any other characterization of terrorism, it cap-
tures the fear of an internal threat. The idea is that some 
Muslims are part of small, covert groups that will spontane-
ously rise up and begin attacking other citizens. These 
groups are particularly frightening because they are com-
posed of people who seem to be assimilated – people who 
live ordinary lives, work normal jobs, and have families. The 
covert operatives even maintain their cover for years, only to 
use their role as trusted members of the community to per-
petrate attacks. They are outsiders with all the characteris-
tics of allies except for the hidden intention to attack when 
their host country is vulnerable. Although little evidence of 
sleeper cells has ever been uncovered, they figure promi-
nently in news reports on terrorism. Many of the fictional 
attack scenarios that reporters discuss involve these sleeper 
cells launching surprise attacks. 
In 2001, Stanley Fish predicted that “If we reduce the en-
emy to “evil,” we conjure up a shape-shifting demon, a wild-
card moral anarchist beyond comprehension” (Fish 2001: 
A19). This turned out to be right, but his words of caution 
were not followed by many in the media. The effects of a 
narrative of demonizing terrorism and linking it closely with 
a religion and ethnicity are already visible in the United 
States and Europe. The danger now is that the same cultural 
militarization might spread into Canada, as it becomes a 
larger partner in the War on Terror.  
 
Canada’s War 
 
Canada’s responses to the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have been important symbolic acts of autonomy. The coun-
try is often compelled to side with the US and UK in con-
flicts, but over the past century has increasingly sought to 
establish a distinct foreign policy. In 1914, Canada entered 
the First World War with Britain. Because of the countries’ 
political relationship, the British declaration of war pulled 
Canada into the conflict without the latter having much 
choice. Canada’s strong performance in the war contributed 
to national pride and led to a more autonomous foreign 
policy. Although Canada did enter the Second World War in 
support of Britain, it is important that it did so on its own 
terms. The declaration came on September 9, six days after 
the British declaration (Watson 1998: 156). This history of 
growing independence in deciding whether to declare war 
helps to explain why Canada has thus far taken a unique 
approach that does not universally support the US.   
It remains important to display autonomy, both from 
Britain and from the United States. The former is still linked 
to Canada by a history of direct and indirect control. The 
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latter is perhaps an even stronger force for swaying Canadi-
an foreign policy because of the countries’ close economic 
links and cultural similarities. The decisions to not partici-
pate in the invasion of Afghanistan and to oppose the Iraq 
War were powerful statements of independence. In fact, 
these decisions gave Canada the appearance of having a 
greater capacity to resist American influence that the British, 
who are widely seen as blindly following the Bush admin-
istration’s lead. Prime Minister Blair in particular is por-
trayed as an American puppet, someone who cared more 
about pleasing President Bush than looking out for his coun-
try’s interests. For much of the War on Terror the United 
States and Britain were the largest coalition partners. The 
close relationship has dissolved since Bush and Blair left 
office and Britain has scaled down its commitment in Iraq. 
Its politicians show growing resistance to supporting Ameri-
can interests in the Middle East.  
A new partnership between the United States and Cana-
da is forming to replace, at least partially, the weakening link 
between the US and Britain. This new partnership threatens 
to once again bring Canada into a supporting role for anoth-
er country. Canadian participation in Afghanistan began 
soon after it was declared by President Bush. This early 
commitment to the war was primarily a symbolic gesture, as 
no soldiers participated in the invasion of Afghanistan. More 
direct support developed slowly, growing from forty soldiers 
in 2003 to around 2,500 in 2009. The Canadian contingent 
has engaged in heavy fighting against Taliban forces around 
Kandahar. It has also played a major role in the reconstruc-
tion effort in the region. The large American force often 
overshadows the Canadian efforts. Given the size of the 
Canadian contingent, it must fight according to the terms of 
the US military. 
In short, Canada has gradually shifted to a militaristic 
foreign policy and become increasingly supportive of US 
objectives (McQuaig 2007). Stephen Harper’s announce-
ment that Canadian soldiers would begin withdrawing in 
2011 may reverse this. Still, Canada’s participation in the war 
for a decade and its ongoing support of American counter-
terrorism has made the country a major partner in the strug-
gle and given the United States the appearance of interna-
tional support that it badly needs. Even after the 2011 with-
drawal, Canada may have to face the threat of terrorist attack 
because of its participation in the war and tacit support of 
the coalition even when its soldiers are not involved. Canada 
continues to be morally and strategically linked to the coali-
tion. As Wesley Wark explains, “We live on the northern 
flank of Al Qaeda’s great enemy and, whether we like it or 
not, we have to conceive of security in hemispheric terms” 
(Wark 2005). The military strategy reinforces this mutual 
dependency. The new coalition policy emphasizes integra-
tion between American and Canadian units, which may 
further unify the country’s policies regarding terrorism or at 
least implicate Canada in American decisions. This means 
that whatever course the Canadian military takes, the coun-
try is already firmly committed to the war. The social ten-
sions produced by the war have taken root and Canadians 
have opened themselves to the constant threat of terrorist 
attack. 
The War on Terror has already had profound effects on 
the two major coalition powers. In each country, civil liber-
ties have been eroded, discrimination has increased, and 
narratives of domestic terrorism have become more com-
mon. The central question now is what effects Canadian 
society will experience as the country plays a more direct 
role in the conflict and is more closely aligned with US poli-
cy. Initially, Canada may seem a poor candidate for social 
militarization. The widespread opposition to sending sol-
diers into Afghanistan indicates an opposition to war, and 
perhaps also its corollaries. Only thirty-nine percent of the 
population supports the decision; it has been unpopular 
since the first soldiers were sent in (Taber 2010). Neverthe-
less, the same kind of anti-Islamic rhetoric that is common 
in the US is becoming prevalent in Canada. Despite its mul-
ticulturalism, Canada seems as susceptible to demonizing its 
enemies as its allies (McCutheon 2009).  
 
The Culture War in Canada 
 
Tolerance and cosmopolitanism are central to Canadian 
culture, or at least to Canadian identity. There is a great deal 
of evidence suggesting that Canada does embody these traits 
better than most other democracies. As a multi-nation state, 
Canada demonstrates a high degree of institutional tolerance 
compared to other western states. The country has also 
demonstrated greater respect for indigenous peoples than 
many others facing the dilemma of how to compensate for 
past attacks (Banting 2006). Kymlicka finds that intermar-
riage is prevalent and there is a high frequency of friendships 
transcending ethnic divisions (Kymlicka 2001: 37). William 
Watson argues that Canadian tolerance is particularly im-
portant as a way of giving Canadians a unique identity and 
separating them from the US (Watson 1998). Indeed, de-
scriptions of multiculturalism are often framed in opposition 
to its neighbour (Barry 2001: 294). 
Many scholars have challenged the idea of the Canadian 
mosaic and shown that the perception of tolerance is some-
what misguided (Watson 1998: 173). Reitz and Breton argue 
that the perceived multicultural difference between the US 
and Canada is illusory and that there is really very little 
separating the two in this regard (Reitz 1994). Antipathy 
toward immigrants and selection biases when choosing who 
is allowed into the country, are common. Commenting on 
immigration trends between 1971 and 1981, Watson says 
“We naturally think of the United States as the more racist 
society, but in fact we were the ones with the stronger pref-
erence for Europeans” (Watson 1998: 152).  
The degree of toleration in Canada is therefore contested. 
Many studies can be cited supporting it and providing coun-
terevidence. It appears that much of the disagreement has to 
do with the difficulty in operationalizing tolerance. Whatever 
the truth, Watson’s point is probably correct – the identity of 
multiculturalism is central to citizens’ self-perception. 
Whether or not it is true, the ideal of respect for minority 
rights is a powerful normative force. Even if it is not always 
borne out in practice, it can serve as a guiding principle. In 
fact, it is particularly important in this sense because this 
162	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, 157-164 	  
value can serve as a starting place for mistreated minorities 
to work towards better treatment.  
Foreigners also tend to perceive the country as being 
cosmopolitan, especially compared to the US. One reason for 
the perception of greater tolerance is that it is institutional-
ized. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have inclusive 
policies at the national level. These are weaker in the US and 
more prevalent at the state and local levels. Still, the sub-
stantive results are often the same (Banting 2006: 55). The 
evidence against Canadian multiculturalism suggests that 
the country has some of the xenophobia shown in Europe 
and the US. This is particularly true since the evidence 
against Canadian tolerance often focuses on the treatment of 
immigrants. 
Canadian culture will have to contend with many of the 
same side effects of the War on Terror as the other coalition 
partners. Even if the country withdraws its military support, 
it remains deeply engaged in the same understanding of 
terrorism. Canada is largely dependent on a perception of 
the conflict that is created by its allies. Canadian media 
receives much of its information from foreign news agencies, 
primarily services run by American, British, and French 
agencies (Karim 2003: 14). This makes it susceptible to the 
anti-immigration sentiment that is popular in each of these 
countries. It also leaves Canadians under the influence of 
countries that may not have the same degree of respect for 
minority rights. As Said points out, the American media has 
a long history of presenting the Islamic world as a hostile 
entity threatening the west and that even apparently objec-
tive reporting often hides this bias (Said 1997). The framing 
effect of the media that produce much of the information 
about terrorism cannot be underestimated. It plays an active 
role in shaping the perception of threat.  
Media are mobile spotlights, not passive mirrors of society; 
selectivity is the instrument of their action. A news story 
adopts a certain frame and rejects or downplays material 
that is discrepant. A story is a choice, a way of seeing an 
event that also amounts to a way of screening from sight  
(Gitlin 1980: 49-50). 
This framing effect is not unique to foreign media. Canadian 
reporting has also contributed to the militarization of the 
civil sphere by excluding the majority viewpoint. Most Cana-
dians oppose the War in Afghanistan and have since the first 
soldiers were sent into the country (Taber 2010). Neverthe-
less, news agencies often fail to report this bias. The popular 
opposition is overlooked in favor of coverage of security 
threats. The national media’s coverage of domestic politics 
has often taken a conservative tone and contributed to the 
suspicion of attacks from within (Steuter 2008; Steuter 
2009).  
One can find evidence of the effects of the War on Terror in 
the responses to Muslim immigrants and activists. Many 
random attacks have occurred over the past decade, often 
linked to hate speech that is clearly directed against Mus-
lims. When reasons are given for these attacks, the justifica-
tion is usually framed in terms of the threat that Islam poses 
to the West. The opposition to Tariq Ramadan is a prime 
example of this fear. The Oxford University professor faced 
strong opposition from those claiming that he was a covert 
supporter of terrorism when he gave two lectures in Montre-
al in the spring of 2010. Many feared that he might be secret-
ly working to spread discontent and to encourage domestic 
terrorism. Most telling of all was the criticism that he hides 
his true views behind a message of moderation and tolerance 
(Scott 2010). This is, of course, a claim that cannot be refut-
ed, as anything Ramadan says will either be interpreted as 
extremism or a façade. The same goes for all of the charges 
made against Muslim immigrants.  
Muslims are clearly not the monolithic force that the clash of 
civilizations theory implies. Indeed, Canada provides exam-
ples of how many internal divisions there are. These show 
that it is misleading to characterize all members of the reli-
gion as being the same. First, there is the lack of any large-
scale organization. One of the reasons Canadian Muslims 
have been easy targets is that they are heterogeneous, and 
have formed many associations rather than a single powerful 
organization that is capable of speaking on behalf of a uni-
fied group (Haddad 2002: 13). These organizational difficul-
ties and the inability of Muslims to mount a united defensive 
against racism show that as a group they do not have the 
cohesion to wage a culture war on Canadian society. Second, 
Canadian Muslims, and Muslims in other western countries 
for that matter, have lacked the power to create an influen-
tial counter narrative over the past decade. The narrative of 
Muslim uniformity and hostility has gone relatively unchal-
lenged. 
Canada cannot resist being reshaped by Muslim influence. 
Several recent disputes have made this clear. One of the 
most controversial aspects of Islam are the niqabs and bur-
kas that some women wear to cover their faces. Although 
these are relatively rare in western countries, many have 
issued bans on these to force women to expose their faces in 
public. Montreal’s Bill 94 would require workers in the pub-
lic sector to always have their faces uncovered (Crowd 
Protests Quebec Niqab Ban  2010). Since the bill was pro-
posed it has been resisted by Muslims and civil libertarians, 
but has been justified by the Immigration Department as a 
necessary protection against terrorism. The educational 
system, committed to both multicultural and secular values 
(Collet 2007) will likewise have to adjust. It is structured to 
encourage cultural understanding and tolerance, and teach 
immigrants this perspective, but by doing this in a secular 
setting it conflicts with Muslims’ strong religious convic-
tions. The result is an antagonism between two central val-
ues. These and other issues will have to be resolved, but they 
would be best dealt with through a rational discussion and 
attempt at accommodation. Meeting these challenges from 
the militarized perspective of a country at war with Islam 
would be counterproductive.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has shown the growing militarization of western 
states participating in the War on Terror. Although this 
process is encouraged by the governments’ actions and the 
prevalence of entertainment that reinforces the values of the 
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clash of civilizations view, the shift seems to have no single 
institutional source. Theories of ideology often attribute 
change to manipulation by a single force. In this case, the 
same narrative is reproduced by many actors: the media, 
scholars who essentialize Muslim identity, and citizens who 
use the war as an excuse to express their xenophobia. Alt-
hough governments are responsible for waging the War on 
Terror and determining its objectives, an array of actors in 
the civil sphere contribute to the social militarization.  
In most cases, the current suspicion of Muslims as ene-
my combatants is largely rooted in a preexisting suspicion of 
immigrants. This is certainly true for the countries discussed 
in this essay. The US and Canada in particular have a history 
of hostility towards residents of enemy nationalities, even 
when these people appear to be loyal citizens. Many of the 
overt signs of repression have disappeared, only to be re-
placed by suspicion from fellow citizens.  Muslims in the 
west are widely seen as enemies, no matter how benign they 
appear, and will likely continue to be viewed that way until 
the scope of the war is redefined and we come to a more 
enlightened understanding of it. The demonization of the 
terrorist enemy has implicated many loyal citizens and 
threatens to reverse the progress of cultural tolerance.  The 
fact that this comes in less overt forms than internment does 
not make the effects any less damaging. 
There is some question about whether Canada really de-
serves its reputation as a cosmopolitan country with respect 
for minority rights. This question should continue to be 
assessed. However, whatever the truth, the idea of Canada as 
a culturally sensitive country is central to the national identi-
ty. This identity, along with the country’s Muslim inhabit-
ants, is increasingly under threat from the growing militari-
zation of western societies in response to the terrorist threat.  
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